Merge branch 'ethereum:master' into master

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juga1980 2025-07-12 12:56:00 +02:00 committed by GitHub
commit 46cfd1326b
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19 changed files with 1248 additions and 48 deletions

2
.github/CODEOWNERS vendored
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@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ miner/ @MariusVanDerWijden @fjl @rjl493456442
node/ @fjl node/ @fjl
p2p/ @fjl @zsfelfoldi p2p/ @fjl @zsfelfoldi
rlp/ @fjl rlp/ @fjl
params/ @fjl @karalabe @gballet @rjl493456442 @zsfelfoldi params/ @fjl @gballet @rjl493456442 @zsfelfoldi
rpc/ @fjl rpc/ @fjl

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@ -6,28 +6,33 @@
"description": "A mining flaw could cause miners to erroneously calculate PoW, due to an index overflow, if DAG size is exceeding the maximum 32 bit unsigned value.\n\nThis occurred on the ETC chain on 2020-11-06. This is likely to trigger for ETH mainnet around block `11550000`/epoch `385`, slated to occur early January 2021.\n\nThis issue is relevant only for miners, non-mining nodes are unaffected, since non-mining nodes use a smaller verification cache instead of a full DAG.", "description": "A mining flaw could cause miners to erroneously calculate PoW, due to an index overflow, if DAG size is exceeding the maximum 32 bit unsigned value.\n\nThis occurred on the ETC chain on 2020-11-06. This is likely to trigger for ETH mainnet around block `11550000`/epoch `385`, slated to occur early January 2021.\n\nThis issue is relevant only for miners, non-mining nodes are unaffected, since non-mining nodes use a smaller verification cache instead of a full DAG.",
"links": [ "links": [
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/21793", "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/21793",
"https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth_security_release/", "https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth-security-release",
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/567d41d9363706b4b13ce0903804e8acf214af49" "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/567d41d9363706b4b13ce0903804e8acf214af49",
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-v592-xf75-856p"
], ],
"introduced": "v1.6.0", "introduced": "v1.6.0",
"fixed": "v1.9.24", "fixed": "v1.9.24",
"published": "2020-11-12", "published": "2020-11-12",
"severity": "Medium", "severity": "Medium",
"check": "Geth\\/v1\\.(6|7|8)\\..*|Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.2(1|2|3)-.*" "CVE": "CVE-2020-26240",
"check": "Geth\\/v1\\.(6|7|8)\\..*|Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.\\d-.*|Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.1.*|Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.2(0|1|2|3)-.*"
}, },
{ {
"name": "GoCrash", "name": "Denial of service due to Go CVE-2020-28362",
"uid": "GETH-2020-02", "uid": "GETH-2020-02",
"summary": "A denial-of-service issue can be used to crash Geth nodes during block processing, due to an underlying bug in Go (CVE-2020-28362) versions < `1.15.5`, or `<1.14.12`", "summary": "A denial-of-service issue can be used to crash Geth nodes during block processing, due to an underlying bug in Go (CVE-2020-28362) versions < `1.15.5`, or `<1.14.12`",
"description": "The DoS issue can be used to crash all Geth nodes during block processing, the effects of which would be that a major part of the Ethereum network went offline.\n\nOutside of Go-Ethereum, the issue is most likely relevant for all forks of Geth (such as TurboGeth or ETCs core-geth) which is built with versions of Go which contains the vulnerability.", "description": "The DoS issue can be used to crash all Geth nodes during block processing, the effects of which would be that a major part of the Ethereum network went offline.\n\nOutside of Go-Ethereum, the issue is most likely relevant for all forks of Geth (such as TurboGeth or ETCs core-geth) which is built with versions of Go which contains the vulnerability.",
"links": [ "links": [
"https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth_security_release/", "https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth-security-release",
"https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/NpBGTTmKzpM", "https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/NpBGTTmKzpM",
"https://github.com/golang/go/issues/42552" "https://github.com/golang/go/issues/42552",
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-m6gx-rhvj-fh52"
], ],
"introduced": "v0.0.0",
"fixed": "v1.9.24", "fixed": "v1.9.24",
"published": "2020-11-12", "published": "2020-11-12",
"severity": "Critical", "severity": "Critical",
"CVE": "CVE-2020-28362",
"check": "Geth.*\\/go1\\.(11(.*)|12(.*)|13(.*)|14|14\\.(\\d|10|11|)|15|15\\.[0-4])$" "check": "Geth.*\\/go1\\.(11(.*)|12(.*)|13(.*)|14|14\\.(\\d|10|11|)|15|15\\.[0-4])$"
}, },
{ {
@ -36,26 +41,162 @@
"summary": "A consensus flaw in Geth, related to `datacopy` precompile", "summary": "A consensus flaw in Geth, related to `datacopy` precompile",
"description": "Geth erroneously performed a 'shallow' copy when the precompiled `datacopy` (at `0x00...04`) was invoked. An attacker could deploy a contract that uses the shallow copy to corrupt the contents of the `RETURNDATA`, thus causing a consensus failure.", "description": "Geth erroneously performed a 'shallow' copy when the precompiled `datacopy` (at `0x00...04`) was invoked. An attacker could deploy a contract that uses the shallow copy to corrupt the contents of the `RETURNDATA`, thus causing a consensus failure.",
"links": [ "links": [
"https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth_security_release/" "https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth-security-release",
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-69v6-xc2j-r2jf"
], ],
"introduced": "v1.9.7", "introduced": "v1.9.7",
"fixed": "v1.9.17", "fixed": "v1.9.17",
"published": "2020-11-12", "published": "2020-11-12",
"severity": "Critical", "severity": "Critical",
"CVE": "CVE-2020-26241",
"check": "Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.(7|8|9|10|11|12|13|14|15|16).*$" "check": "Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.(7|8|9|10|11|12|13|14|15|16).*$"
}, },
{ {
"name": "GethCrash", "name": "Geth DoS via MULMOD",
"uid": "GETH-2020-04", "uid": "GETH-2020-04",
"summary": "A denial-of-service issue can be used to crash Geth nodes during block processing", "summary": "A denial-of-service issue can be used to crash Geth nodes during block processing",
"description": "Full details to be disclosed at a later date", "description": "Affected versions suffer from a vulnerability which can be exploited through the `MULMOD` operation, by specifying a modulo of `0`: `mulmod(a,b,0)`, causing a `panic` in the underlying library. \nThe crash was in the `uint256` library, where a buffer [underflowed](https://github.com/holiman/uint256/blob/4ce82e695c10ddad57215bdbeafb68b8c5df2c30/uint256.go#L442).\n\n\tif `d == 0`, `dLen` remains `0`\n\nand https://github.com/holiman/uint256/blob/4ce82e695c10ddad57215bdbeafb68b8c5df2c30/uint256.go#L451 will try to access index `[-1]`.\n\nThe `uint256` library was first merged in this [commit](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/cf6674539c589f80031f3371a71c6a80addbe454), on 2020-06-08. \nExploiting this vulnerabilty would cause all vulnerable nodes to drop off the network. \n\nThe issue was brought to our attention through a [bug report](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/issues/21367), showing a `panic` occurring on sync from genesis on the Ropsten network.\n \nIt was estimated that the least obvious way to fix this would be to merge the fix into `uint256`, make a new release of that library and then update the geth-dependency.\n",
"links": [ "links": [
"https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth_security_release/" "https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth-security-release",
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-jm5c-rv3w-w83m",
"https://github.com/holiman/uint256/releases/tag/v1.1.1",
"https://github.com/holiman/uint256/pull/80",
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/21368"
], ],
"introduced": "v1.9.16", "introduced": "v1.9.16",
"fixed": "v1.9.18", "fixed": "v1.9.18",
"published": "2020-11-12", "published": "2020-11-12",
"severity": "Critical", "severity": "Critical",
"CVE": "CVE-2020-26242",
"check": "Geth\\/v1\\.9.(16|17).*$" "check": "Geth\\/v1\\.9.(16|17).*$"
},
{
"name": "LES Server DoS via GetProofsV2",
"uid": "GETH-2020-05",
"summary": "A DoS vulnerability can make a LES server crash.",
"description": "A DoS vulnerability can make a LES server crash via malicious GetProofsV2 request from a connected LES client.\n\nThe vulnerability was patched in #21896.\n\nThis vulnerability only concern users explicitly running geth as a light server",
"links": [
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-r33q-22hv-j29q",
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/21896"
],
"introduced": "v1.8.0",
"fixed": "v1.9.25",
"published": "2020-12-10",
"severity": "Medium",
"CVE": "CVE-2020-26264",
"check": "(Geth\\/v1\\.8\\.*)|(Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.\\d-.*)|(Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.1\\d-.*)|(Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.(20|21|22|23|24)-.*)$"
},
{
"name": "SELFDESTRUCT-recreate consensus flaw",
"uid": "GETH-2020-06",
"introduced": "v1.9.4",
"fixed": "v1.9.20",
"summary": "A consensus-vulnerability in Geth could cause a chain split, where vulnerable versions refuse to accept the canonical chain.",
"description": "A flaw was repoted at 2020-08-11 by John Youngseok Yang (Software Platform Lab), where a particular sequence of transactions could cause a consensus failure.\n\n- Tx 1:\n - `sender` invokes `caller`.\n - `caller` invokes `0xaa`. `0xaa` has 3 wei, does a self-destruct-to-self\n - `caller` does a `1 wei` -call to `0xaa`, who thereby has 1 wei (the code in `0xaa` still executed, since the tx is still ongoing, but doesn't redo the selfdestruct, it takes a different path if callvalue is non-zero)\n\n-Tx 2:\n - `sender` does a 5-wei call to 0xaa. No exec (since no code). \n\nIn geth, the result would be that `0xaa` had `6 wei`, whereas OE reported (correctly) `5` wei. Furthermore, in geth, if the second tx was not executed, the `0xaa` would be destructed, resulting in `0 wei`. Thus obviously wrong. \n\nIt was determined that the root cause was this [commit](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/223b950944f494a5b4e0957fd9f92c48b09037ad) from [this PR](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/19953). The semantics of `createObject` was subtly changd, into returning a non-nil object (with `deleted=true`) where it previously did not if the account had been destructed. This return value caused the new object to inherit the old `balance`.\n",
"links": [
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-xw37-57qp-9mm4"
],
"published": "2020-12-10",
"severity": "High",
"CVE": "CVE-2020-26265",
"check": "(Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.(4|5|6|7|8|9)-.*)|(Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.1\\d-.*)$"
},
{
"name": "Not ready for London upgrade",
"uid": "GETH-2021-01",
"summary": "The client is not ready for the 'London' technical upgrade, and will deviate from the canonical chain when the London upgrade occurs (at block '12965000' around August 4, 2021.",
"description": "At (or around) August 4, Ethereum will undergo a technical upgrade called 'London'. Clients not upgraded will fail to progress on the canonical chain.",
"links": [
"https://github.com/ethereum/eth1.0-specs/blob/master/network-upgrades/mainnet-upgrades/london.md",
"https://notes.ethereum.org/@timbeiko/ropsten-postmortem"
],
"introduced": "v1.10.1",
"fixed": "v1.10.6",
"published": "2021-07-22",
"severity": "High",
"check": "(Geth\\/v1\\.10\\.(1|2|3|4|5)-.*)$"
},
{
"name": "RETURNDATA corruption via datacopy",
"uid": "GETH-2021-02",
"summary": "A consensus-flaw in the Geth EVM could cause a node to deviate from the canonical chain.",
"description": "A memory-corruption bug within the EVM can cause a consensus error, where vulnerable nodes obtain a different `stateRoot` when processing a maliciously crafted transaction. This, in turn, would lead to the chain being split: mainnet splitting in two forks.\n\nAll Geth versions supporting the London hard fork are vulnerable (the bug is older than London), so all users should update.\n\nThis bug was exploited on Mainnet at block 13107518.\n\nCredits for the discovery go to @guidovranken (working for Sentnl during an audit of the Telos EVM) and reported via bounty@ethereum.org.",
"links": [
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/blob/master/docs/postmortems/2021-08-22-split-postmortem.md",
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-9856-9gg9-qcmq",
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/releases/tag/v1.10.8"
],
"introduced": "v1.10.0",
"fixed": "v1.10.8",
"published": "2021-08-24",
"severity": "High",
"CVE": "CVE-2021-39137",
"check": "(Geth\\/v1\\.10\\.(0|1|2|3|4|5|6|7)-.*)$"
},
{
"name": "DoS via malicious `snap/1` request",
"uid": "GETH-2021-03",
"summary": "A vulnerable node is susceptible to crash when processing a maliciously crafted message from a peer, via the snap/1 protocol. The crash can be triggered by sending a malicious snap/1 GetTrieNodes package.",
"description": "The `snap/1` protocol handler contains two vulnerabilities related to the `GetTrieNodes` packet, which can be exploited to crash the node. Full details are available at the Github security [advisory](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-59hh-656j-3p7v)",
"links": [
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-59hh-656j-3p7v",
"https://geth.ethereum.org/docs/vulnerabilities/vulnerabilities",
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/23657"
],
"introduced": "v1.10.0",
"fixed": "v1.10.9",
"published": "2021-10-24",
"severity": "Medium",
"CVE": "CVE-2021-41173",
"check": "(Geth\\/v1\\.10\\.(0|1|2|3|4|5|6|7|8)-.*)$"
},
{
"name": "DoS via malicious p2p message",
"uid": "GETH-2022-01",
"summary": "A vulnerable node can crash via p2p messages sent from an attacker node, if running with non-default log options.",
"description": "A vulnerable node, if configured to use high verbosity logging, can be made to crash when handling specially crafted p2p messages sent from an attacker node. Full details are available at the Github security [advisory](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-wjxw-gh3m-7pm5)",
"links": [
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-wjxw-gh3m-7pm5",
"https://geth.ethereum.org/docs/vulnerabilities/vulnerabilities",
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/24507"
],
"introduced": "v1.10.0",
"fixed": "v1.10.17",
"published": "2022-05-11",
"severity": "Low",
"CVE": "CVE-2022-29177",
"check": "(Geth\\/v1\\.10\\.(0|1|2|3|4|5|6|7|8|9|10|11|12|13|14|15|16)-.*)$"
},
{
"name": "DoS via malicious p2p message",
"uid": "GETH-2023-01",
"summary": "A vulnerable node can be made to consume unbounded amounts of memory when handling specially crafted p2p messages sent from an attacker node.",
"description": "The p2p handler spawned a new goroutine to respond to ping requests. By flooding a node with ping requests, an unbounded number of goroutines can be created, leading to resource exhaustion and potentially crash due to OOM.",
"links": [
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-ppjg-v974-84cm",
"https://geth.ethereum.org/docs/vulnerabilities/vulnerabilities"
],
"introduced": "v1.10.0",
"fixed": "v1.12.1",
"published": "2023-09-06",
"severity": "High",
"CVE": "CVE-2023-40591",
"check": "(Geth\\/v1\\.(10|11)\\..*)|(Geth\\/v1\\.12\\.0-.*)$"
},
{
"name": "DoS via malicious p2p message",
"uid": "GETH-2024-01",
"summary": "A vulnerable node can be made to consume very large amounts of memory when handling specially crafted p2p messages sent from an attacker node.",
"description": "A vulnerable node can be made to consume very large amounts of memory when handling specially crafted p2p messages sent from an attacker node. Full details will be available at the Github security [advisory](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-4xc9-8hmq-j652)",
"links": [
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-4xc9-8hmq-j652",
"https://geth.ethereum.org/docs/vulnerabilities/vulnerabilities"
],
"introduced": "v1.10.0",
"fixed": "v1.13.15",
"published": "2024-05-06",
"severity": "High",
"CVE": "CVE-2024-32972",
"check": "(Geth\\/v1\\.(10|11|12)\\..*)|(Geth\\/v1\\.13\\.\\d-.*)|(Geth\\/v1\\.13\\.1(0|1|2|3|4)-.*)$"
} }
] ]

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RWQkliYstQBOKFQFQTjmCd6TPw07VZyWFSB3v4+1BM1kv8eHLE5FDy2OkPEqtdaL53xftlrHoJQie0uCcovdlSV8kpyxiLrxEQ0=
trusted comment: Here's a trusted comment
3CnkIuz9MEDa7uNyGZAbKZhuirwfiqm7E1uQHrd2SiO4Y8+Akw9vs052AyKw0s5nhbYHCZE2IMQdHNjKwxEGAQ==

View file

@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
"description": "A mining flaw could cause miners to erroneously calculate PoW, due to an index overflow, if DAG size is exceeding the maximum 32 bit unsigned value.\n\nThis occurred on the ETC chain on 2020-11-06. This is likely to trigger for ETH mainnet around block `11550000`/epoch `385`, slated to occur early January 2021.\n\nThis issue is relevant only for miners, non-mining nodes are unaffected, since non-mining nodes use a smaller verification cache instead of a full DAG.", "description": "A mining flaw could cause miners to erroneously calculate PoW, due to an index overflow, if DAG size is exceeding the maximum 32 bit unsigned value.\n\nThis occurred on the ETC chain on 2020-11-06. This is likely to trigger for ETH mainnet around block `11550000`/epoch `385`, slated to occur early January 2021.\n\nThis issue is relevant only for miners, non-mining nodes are unaffected, since non-mining nodes use a smaller verification cache instead of a full DAG.",
"links": [ "links": [
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/21793", "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/21793",
"https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth_security_release/", "https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth-security-release",
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/567d41d9363706b4b13ce0903804e8acf214af49", "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/567d41d9363706b4b13ce0903804e8acf214af49",
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-v592-xf75-856p" "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-v592-xf75-856p"
], ],
@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
"summary": "A denial-of-service issue can be used to crash Geth nodes during block processing, due to an underlying bug in Go (CVE-2020-28362) versions < `1.15.5`, or `<1.14.12`", "summary": "A denial-of-service issue can be used to crash Geth nodes during block processing, due to an underlying bug in Go (CVE-2020-28362) versions < `1.15.5`, or `<1.14.12`",
"description": "The DoS issue can be used to crash all Geth nodes during block processing, the effects of which would be that a major part of the Ethereum network went offline.\n\nOutside of Go-Ethereum, the issue is most likely relevant for all forks of Geth (such as TurboGeth or ETCs core-geth) which is built with versions of Go which contains the vulnerability.", "description": "The DoS issue can be used to crash all Geth nodes during block processing, the effects of which would be that a major part of the Ethereum network went offline.\n\nOutside of Go-Ethereum, the issue is most likely relevant for all forks of Geth (such as TurboGeth or ETCs core-geth) which is built with versions of Go which contains the vulnerability.",
"links": [ "links": [
"https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth_security_release/", "https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth-security-release",
"https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/NpBGTTmKzpM", "https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/NpBGTTmKzpM",
"https://github.com/golang/go/issues/42552", "https://github.com/golang/go/issues/42552",
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-m6gx-rhvj-fh52" "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-m6gx-rhvj-fh52"
@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
"summary": "A consensus flaw in Geth, related to `datacopy` precompile", "summary": "A consensus flaw in Geth, related to `datacopy` precompile",
"description": "Geth erroneously performed a 'shallow' copy when the precompiled `datacopy` (at `0x00...04`) was invoked. An attacker could deploy a contract that uses the shallow copy to corrupt the contents of the `RETURNDATA`, thus causing a consensus failure.", "description": "Geth erroneously performed a 'shallow' copy when the precompiled `datacopy` (at `0x00...04`) was invoked. An attacker could deploy a contract that uses the shallow copy to corrupt the contents of the `RETURNDATA`, thus causing a consensus failure.",
"links": [ "links": [
"https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth_security_release/", "https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth-security-release",
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-69v6-xc2j-r2jf" "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-69v6-xc2j-r2jf"
], ],
"introduced": "v1.9.7", "introduced": "v1.9.7",
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
"summary": "A denial-of-service issue can be used to crash Geth nodes during block processing", "summary": "A denial-of-service issue can be used to crash Geth nodes during block processing",
"description": "Affected versions suffer from a vulnerability which can be exploited through the `MULMOD` operation, by specifying a modulo of `0`: `mulmod(a,b,0)`, causing a `panic` in the underlying library. \nThe crash was in the `uint256` library, where a buffer [underflowed](https://github.com/holiman/uint256/blob/4ce82e695c10ddad57215bdbeafb68b8c5df2c30/uint256.go#L442).\n\n\tif `d == 0`, `dLen` remains `0`\n\nand https://github.com/holiman/uint256/blob/4ce82e695c10ddad57215bdbeafb68b8c5df2c30/uint256.go#L451 will try to access index `[-1]`.\n\nThe `uint256` library was first merged in this [commit](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/cf6674539c589f80031f3371a71c6a80addbe454), on 2020-06-08. \nExploiting this vulnerabilty would cause all vulnerable nodes to drop off the network. \n\nThe issue was brought to our attention through a [bug report](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/issues/21367), showing a `panic` occurring on sync from genesis on the Ropsten network.\n \nIt was estimated that the least obvious way to fix this would be to merge the fix into `uint256`, make a new release of that library and then update the geth-dependency.\n", "description": "Affected versions suffer from a vulnerability which can be exploited through the `MULMOD` operation, by specifying a modulo of `0`: `mulmod(a,b,0)`, causing a `panic` in the underlying library. \nThe crash was in the `uint256` library, where a buffer [underflowed](https://github.com/holiman/uint256/blob/4ce82e695c10ddad57215bdbeafb68b8c5df2c30/uint256.go#L442).\n\n\tif `d == 0`, `dLen` remains `0`\n\nand https://github.com/holiman/uint256/blob/4ce82e695c10ddad57215bdbeafb68b8c5df2c30/uint256.go#L451 will try to access index `[-1]`.\n\nThe `uint256` library was first merged in this [commit](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/cf6674539c589f80031f3371a71c6a80addbe454), on 2020-06-08. \nExploiting this vulnerabilty would cause all vulnerable nodes to drop off the network. \n\nThe issue was brought to our attention through a [bug report](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/issues/21367), showing a `panic` occurring on sync from genesis on the Ropsten network.\n \nIt was estimated that the least obvious way to fix this would be to merge the fix into `uint256`, make a new release of that library and then update the geth-dependency.\n",
"links": [ "links": [
"https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth_security_release/", "https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth-security-release",
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-jm5c-rv3w-w83m", "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-jm5c-rv3w-w83m",
"https://github.com/holiman/uint256/releases/tag/v1.1.1", "https://github.com/holiman/uint256/releases/tag/v1.1.1",
"https://github.com/holiman/uint256/pull/80", "https://github.com/holiman/uint256/pull/80",

View file

@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ func TestVerification(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
// For this test, the pubkey is in testdata/vcheck/minisign.pub // For this test, the pubkey is in testdata/vcheck/minisign.pub
// (the privkey is `minisign.sec`, if we want to expand this test. Password 'test' ) // (the privkey is `minisign.sec`, if we want to expand this test. Password 'test' )
// 1. `minisign -S -l -s ./minisign.sec -m data.json -x ./minisig-sigs/vulnerabilities.json.minisig.1 -c "signature from minisign secret key"`
// 2. `minisign -S -l -s ./minisign.sec -m vulnerabilities.json -x ./minisig-sigs/vulnerabilities.json.minisig.2 -c "Here's a comment" -t "Here's a trusted comment"`
// 3. minisign -S -l -s ./minisign.sec -m vulnerabilities.json -x ./minisig-sigs/vulnerabilities.json.minisig.3 -c "One more (untrusted™) comment" -t "Here's a trusted comment"
pub := "RWQkliYstQBOKOdtClfgC3IypIPX6TAmoEi7beZ4gyR3wsaezvqOMWsp" pub := "RWQkliYstQBOKOdtClfgC3IypIPX6TAmoEi7beZ4gyR3wsaezvqOMWsp"
testVerification(t, pub, "./testdata/vcheck/minisig-sigs/") testVerification(t, pub, "./testdata/vcheck/minisig-sigs/")
}) })
@ -43,7 +46,7 @@ func TestVerification(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
// For this test, the pubkey is in testdata/vcheck/minisign.pub // For this test, the pubkey is in testdata/vcheck/minisign.pub
// (the privkey is `minisign.sec`, if we want to expand this test. Password 'test' ) // (the privkey is `minisign.sec`, if we want to expand this test. Password 'test' )
// `minisign -S -s ./minisign.sec -m data.json -x ./minisig-sigs-new/data.json.minisig` // `minisign -S -s ./minisign.sec -m data.json -x ./minisig-sigs-new/data.json.minisig`
pub := "RWQkliYstQBOKOdtClfgC3IypIPX6TAmoEi7beZ4gyR3wsaezvqOMWsp" pub := "RWQkliYstQBOKOdtClfgC3IypIPX6TAmoEi7beZ4gyR3wsaezvqOMWsp"
testVerification(t, pub, "./testdata/vcheck/minisig-sigs-new/") testVerification(t, pub, "./testdata/vcheck/minisig-sigs-new/")
}) })
@ -53,6 +56,7 @@ func TestVerification(t *testing.T) {
t.Skip("This currently fails, minisign expects 4 lines of data, signify provides only 2") t.Skip("This currently fails, minisign expects 4 lines of data, signify provides only 2")
// For this test, the pubkey is in testdata/vcheck/signifykey.pub // For this test, the pubkey is in testdata/vcheck/signifykey.pub
// (the privkey is `signifykey.sec`, if we want to expand this test. Password 'test' ) // (the privkey is `signifykey.sec`, if we want to expand this test. Password 'test' )
// `signify -S -s signifykey.sec -m data.json -x ./signify-sigs/data.json.sig`
pub := "RWSKLNhZb0KdATtRT7mZC/bybI3t3+Hv/O2i3ye04Dq9fnT9slpZ1a2/" pub := "RWSKLNhZb0KdATtRT7mZC/bybI3t3+Hv/O2i3ye04Dq9fnT9slpZ1a2/"
testVerification(t, pub, "./testdata/vcheck/signify-sigs/") testVerification(t, pub, "./testdata/vcheck/signify-sigs/")
}) })

182
core/types/bal/bal.go Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
// Copyright 2025 The go-ethereum Authors
// This file is part of the go-ethereum library.
//
// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
package bal
import (
"bytes"
"maps"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
"github.com/holiman/uint256"
)
// CodeChange contains the runtime bytecode deployed at an address and the
// transaction index where the deployment took place.
type CodeChange struct {
TxIndex uint16
Code []byte `json:"code,omitempty"`
}
// ConstructionAccountAccess contains post-block account state for mutations as well as
// all storage keys that were read during execution. It is used when building block
// access list during execution.
type ConstructionAccountAccess struct {
// StorageWrites is the post-state values of an account's storage slots
// that were modified in a block, keyed by the slot key and the tx index
// where the modification occurred.
StorageWrites map[common.Hash]map[uint16]common.Hash `json:"storageWrites,omitempty"`
// StorageReads is the set of slot keys that were accessed during block
// execution.
//
// Storage slots which are both read and written (with changed values)
// appear only in StorageWrites.
StorageReads map[common.Hash]struct{} `json:"storageReads,omitempty"`
// BalanceChanges contains the post-transaction balances of an account,
// keyed by transaction indices where it was changed.
BalanceChanges map[uint16]*uint256.Int `json:"balanceChanges,omitempty"`
// NonceChanges contains the post-state nonce values of an account keyed
// by tx index.
NonceChanges map[uint16]uint64 `json:"nonceChanges,omitempty"`
// CodeChange is only set for contract accounts which were deployed in
// the block.
CodeChange *CodeChange `json:"codeChange,omitempty"`
}
// NewConstructionAccountAccess initializes the account access object.
func NewConstructionAccountAccess() *ConstructionAccountAccess {
return &ConstructionAccountAccess{
StorageWrites: make(map[common.Hash]map[uint16]common.Hash),
StorageReads: make(map[common.Hash]struct{}),
BalanceChanges: make(map[uint16]*uint256.Int),
NonceChanges: make(map[uint16]uint64),
}
}
// ConstructionBlockAccessList contains post-block modified state and some state accessed
// in execution (account addresses and storage keys).
type ConstructionBlockAccessList struct {
Accounts map[common.Address]*ConstructionAccountAccess
}
// NewConstructionBlockAccessList instantiates an empty access list.
func NewConstructionBlockAccessList() ConstructionBlockAccessList {
return ConstructionBlockAccessList{
Accounts: make(map[common.Address]*ConstructionAccountAccess),
}
}
// AccountRead records the address of an account that has been read during execution.
func (b *ConstructionBlockAccessList) AccountRead(addr common.Address) {
if _, ok := b.Accounts[addr]; !ok {
b.Accounts[addr] = NewConstructionAccountAccess()
}
}
// StorageRead records a storage key read during execution.
func (b *ConstructionBlockAccessList) StorageRead(address common.Address, key common.Hash) {
if _, ok := b.Accounts[address]; !ok {
b.Accounts[address] = NewConstructionAccountAccess()
}
if _, ok := b.Accounts[address].StorageWrites[key]; ok {
return
}
b.Accounts[address].StorageReads[key] = struct{}{}
}
// StorageWrite records the post-transaction value of a mutated storage slot.
// The storage slot is removed from the list of read slots.
func (b *ConstructionBlockAccessList) StorageWrite(txIdx uint16, address common.Address, key, value common.Hash) {
if _, ok := b.Accounts[address]; !ok {
b.Accounts[address] = NewConstructionAccountAccess()
}
if _, ok := b.Accounts[address].StorageWrites[key]; !ok {
b.Accounts[address].StorageWrites[key] = make(map[uint16]common.Hash)
}
b.Accounts[address].StorageWrites[key][txIdx] = value
delete(b.Accounts[address].StorageReads, key)
}
// CodeChange records the code of a newly-created contract.
func (b *ConstructionBlockAccessList) CodeChange(address common.Address, txIndex uint16, code []byte) {
if _, ok := b.Accounts[address]; !ok {
b.Accounts[address] = NewConstructionAccountAccess()
}
b.Accounts[address].CodeChange = &CodeChange{
TxIndex: txIndex,
Code: bytes.Clone(code),
}
}
// NonceChange records tx post-state nonce of any contract-like accounts whose
// nonce was incremented.
func (b *ConstructionBlockAccessList) NonceChange(address common.Address, txIdx uint16, postNonce uint64) {
if _, ok := b.Accounts[address]; !ok {
b.Accounts[address] = NewConstructionAccountAccess()
}
b.Accounts[address].NonceChanges[txIdx] = postNonce
}
// BalanceChange records the post-transaction balance of an account whose
// balance changed.
func (b *ConstructionBlockAccessList) BalanceChange(txIdx uint16, address common.Address, balance *uint256.Int) {
if _, ok := b.Accounts[address]; !ok {
b.Accounts[address] = NewConstructionAccountAccess()
}
b.Accounts[address].BalanceChanges[txIdx] = balance.Clone()
}
// PrettyPrint returns a human-readable representation of the access list
func (b *ConstructionBlockAccessList) PrettyPrint() string {
enc := b.toEncodingObj()
return enc.PrettyPrint()
}
// Copy returns a deep copy of the access list.
func (b *ConstructionBlockAccessList) Copy() *ConstructionBlockAccessList {
res := NewConstructionBlockAccessList()
for addr, aa := range b.Accounts {
var aaCopy ConstructionAccountAccess
slotWrites := make(map[common.Hash]map[uint16]common.Hash, len(aa.StorageWrites))
for key, m := range aa.StorageWrites {
slotWrites[key] = maps.Clone(m)
}
aaCopy.StorageWrites = slotWrites
aaCopy.StorageReads = maps.Clone(aa.StorageReads)
balances := make(map[uint16]*uint256.Int, len(aa.BalanceChanges))
for index, balance := range aa.BalanceChanges {
balances[index] = balance.Clone()
}
aaCopy.BalanceChanges = balances
aaCopy.NonceChanges = maps.Clone(aa.NonceChanges)
if aa.CodeChange != nil {
aaCopy.CodeChange = &CodeChange{
TxIndex: aa.CodeChange.TxIndex,
Code: bytes.Clone(aa.CodeChange.Code),
}
}
res.Accounts[addr] = &aaCopy
}
return &res
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
// Copyright 2025 The go-ethereum Authors
// This file is part of the go-ethereum library.
//
// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
package bal
import (
"bytes"
"cmp"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"maps"
"slices"
"strings"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/params"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
"github.com/holiman/uint256"
)
//go:generate go run github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp/rlpgen -out bal_encoding_rlp_generated.go -type BlockAccessList -decoder
// These are objects used as input for the access list encoding. They mirror
// the spec format.
// BlockAccessList is the encoding format of ConstructionBlockAccessList.
type BlockAccessList struct {
Accesses []AccountAccess `ssz-max:"300000"`
}
// Validate returns an error if the contents of the access list are not ordered
// according to the spec or any code changes are contained which exceed protocol
// max code size.
func (e *BlockAccessList) Validate() error {
if !slices.IsSortedFunc(e.Accesses, func(a, b AccountAccess) int {
return bytes.Compare(a.Address[:], b.Address[:])
}) {
return errors.New("block access list accounts not in lexicographic order")
}
for _, entry := range e.Accesses {
if err := entry.validate(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// Hash computes the keccak256 hash of the access list
func (e *BlockAccessList) Hash() common.Hash {
var enc bytes.Buffer
err := e.EncodeRLP(&enc)
if err != nil {
// errors here are related to BAL values exceeding maximum size defined
// by the spec. Hard-fail because these cases are not expected to be hit
// under reasonable conditions.
panic(err)
}
return crypto.Keccak256Hash(enc.Bytes())
}
// encodeBalance encodes the provided balance into 16-bytes.
func encodeBalance(val *uint256.Int) [16]byte {
valBytes := val.Bytes()
if len(valBytes) > 16 {
panic("can't encode value that is greater than 16 bytes in size")
}
var enc [16]byte
copy(enc[16-len(valBytes):], valBytes[:])
return enc
}
// encodingBalanceChange is the encoding format of BalanceChange.
type encodingBalanceChange struct {
TxIdx uint16 `ssz-size:"2"`
Balance [16]byte `ssz-size:"16"`
}
// encodingAccountNonce is the encoding format of NonceChange.
type encodingAccountNonce struct {
TxIdx uint16 `ssz-size:"2"`
Nonce uint64 `ssz-size:"8"`
}
// encodingStorageWrite is the encoding format of StorageWrites.
type encodingStorageWrite struct {
TxIdx uint16
ValueAfter [32]byte `ssz-size:"32"`
}
// encodingStorageWrite is the encoding format of SlotWrites.
type encodingSlotWrites struct {
Slot [32]byte `ssz-size:"32"`
Accesses []encodingStorageWrite `ssz-max:"300000"`
}
// validate returns an instance of the encoding-representation slot writes in
// working representation.
func (e *encodingSlotWrites) validate() error {
if slices.IsSortedFunc(e.Accesses, func(a, b encodingStorageWrite) int {
return cmp.Compare[uint16](a.TxIdx, b.TxIdx)
}) {
return nil
}
return errors.New("storage write tx indices not in order")
}
// AccountAccess is the encoding format of ConstructionAccountAccess.
type AccountAccess struct {
Address [20]byte `ssz-size:"20"` // 20-byte Ethereum address
StorageWrites []encodingSlotWrites `ssz-max:"300000"` // Storage changes (slot -> [tx_index -> new_value])
StorageReads [][32]byte `ssz-max:"300000"` // Read-only storage keys
BalanceChanges []encodingBalanceChange `ssz-max:"300000"` // Balance changes ([tx_index -> post_balance])
NonceChanges []encodingAccountNonce `ssz-max:"300000"` // Nonce changes ([tx_index -> new_nonce])
Code []CodeChange `ssz-max:"1"` // Code changes ([tx_index -> new_code])
}
// validate converts the account accesses out of encoding format.
// If any of the keys in the encoding object are not ordered according to the
// spec, an error is returned.
func (e *AccountAccess) validate() error {
// Check the storage write slots are sorted in order
if !slices.IsSortedFunc(e.StorageWrites, func(a, b encodingSlotWrites) int {
return bytes.Compare(a.Slot[:], b.Slot[:])
}) {
return errors.New("storage writes slots not in lexicographic order")
}
for _, write := range e.StorageWrites {
if err := write.validate(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
// Check the storage read slots are sorted in order
if !slices.IsSortedFunc(e.StorageReads, func(a, b [32]byte) int {
return bytes.Compare(a[:], b[:])
}) {
return errors.New("storage read slots not in lexicographic order")
}
// Check the balance changes are sorted in order
if !slices.IsSortedFunc(e.BalanceChanges, func(a, b encodingBalanceChange) int {
return cmp.Compare[uint16](a.TxIdx, b.TxIdx)
}) {
return errors.New("balance changes not in ascending order by tx index")
}
// Check the nonce changes are sorted in order
if !slices.IsSortedFunc(e.NonceChanges, func(a, b encodingAccountNonce) int {
return cmp.Compare[uint16](a.TxIdx, b.TxIdx)
}) {
return errors.New("nonce changes not in ascending order by tx index")
}
// Convert code change
if len(e.Code) == 1 {
if len(e.Code[0].Code) > params.MaxCodeSize {
return fmt.Errorf("code change contained oversized code")
}
}
return nil
}
// Copy returns a deep copy of the account access
func (e *AccountAccess) Copy() AccountAccess {
res := AccountAccess{
Address: e.Address,
StorageReads: slices.Clone(e.StorageReads),
BalanceChanges: slices.Clone(e.BalanceChanges),
NonceChanges: slices.Clone(e.NonceChanges),
}
for _, storageWrite := range e.StorageWrites {
res.StorageWrites = append(res.StorageWrites, encodingSlotWrites{
Slot: storageWrite.Slot,
Accesses: slices.Clone(storageWrite.Accesses),
})
}
if len(e.Code) == 1 {
res.Code = []CodeChange{
{
e.Code[0].TxIndex,
bytes.Clone(e.Code[0].Code),
},
}
}
return res
}
// EncodeRLP returns the RLP-encoded access list
func (b *ConstructionBlockAccessList) EncodeRLP(wr io.Writer) error {
return b.toEncodingObj().EncodeRLP(wr)
}
var _ rlp.Encoder = &ConstructionBlockAccessList{}
// toEncodingObj creates an instance of the ConstructionAccountAccess of the type that is
// used as input for the encoding.
func (a *ConstructionAccountAccess) toEncodingObj(addr common.Address) AccountAccess {
res := AccountAccess{
Address: addr,
StorageWrites: make([]encodingSlotWrites, 0),
StorageReads: make([][32]byte, 0),
BalanceChanges: make([]encodingBalanceChange, 0),
NonceChanges: make([]encodingAccountNonce, 0),
Code: nil,
}
// Convert write slots
writeSlots := slices.Collect(maps.Keys(a.StorageWrites))
slices.SortFunc(writeSlots, common.Hash.Cmp)
for _, slot := range writeSlots {
var obj encodingSlotWrites
obj.Slot = slot
slotWrites := a.StorageWrites[slot]
obj.Accesses = make([]encodingStorageWrite, 0, len(slotWrites))
indices := slices.Collect(maps.Keys(slotWrites))
slices.SortFunc(indices, cmp.Compare[uint16])
for _, index := range indices {
obj.Accesses = append(obj.Accesses, encodingStorageWrite{
TxIdx: index,
ValueAfter: slotWrites[index],
})
}
res.StorageWrites = append(res.StorageWrites, obj)
}
// Convert read slots
readSlots := slices.Collect(maps.Keys(a.StorageReads))
slices.SortFunc(readSlots, common.Hash.Cmp)
for _, slot := range readSlots {
res.StorageReads = append(res.StorageReads, slot)
}
// Convert balance changes
balanceIndices := slices.Collect(maps.Keys(a.BalanceChanges))
slices.SortFunc(balanceIndices, cmp.Compare[uint16])
for _, idx := range balanceIndices {
res.BalanceChanges = append(res.BalanceChanges, encodingBalanceChange{
TxIdx: idx,
Balance: encodeBalance(a.BalanceChanges[idx]),
})
}
// Convert nonce changes
nonceIndices := slices.Collect(maps.Keys(a.NonceChanges))
slices.SortFunc(nonceIndices, cmp.Compare[uint16])
for _, idx := range nonceIndices {
res.NonceChanges = append(res.NonceChanges, encodingAccountNonce{
TxIdx: idx,
Nonce: a.NonceChanges[idx],
})
}
// Convert code change
if a.CodeChange != nil {
res.Code = []CodeChange{
{
a.CodeChange.TxIndex,
bytes.Clone(a.CodeChange.Code),
},
}
}
return res
}
// toEncodingObj returns an instance of the access list expressed as the type
// which is used as input for the encoding/decoding.
func (b *ConstructionBlockAccessList) toEncodingObj() *BlockAccessList {
var addresses []common.Address
for addr := range b.Accounts {
addresses = append(addresses, addr)
}
slices.SortFunc(addresses, common.Address.Cmp)
var res BlockAccessList
for _, addr := range addresses {
res.Accesses = append(res.Accesses, b.Accounts[addr].toEncodingObj(addr))
}
return &res
}
func (e *BlockAccessList) PrettyPrint() string {
var res bytes.Buffer
printWithIndent := func(indent int, text string) {
fmt.Fprintf(&res, "%s%s\n", strings.Repeat(" ", indent), text)
}
for _, accountDiff := range e.Accesses {
printWithIndent(0, fmt.Sprintf("%x:", accountDiff.Address))
printWithIndent(1, "storage writes:")
for _, sWrite := range accountDiff.StorageWrites {
printWithIndent(2, fmt.Sprintf("%x:", sWrite.Slot))
for _, access := range sWrite.Accesses {
printWithIndent(3, fmt.Sprintf("%d: %x", access.TxIdx, access.ValueAfter))
}
}
printWithIndent(1, "storage reads:")
for _, slot := range accountDiff.StorageReads {
printWithIndent(2, fmt.Sprintf("%x", slot))
}
printWithIndent(1, "balance changes:")
for _, change := range accountDiff.BalanceChanges {
balance := new(uint256.Int).SetBytes(change.Balance[:]).String()
printWithIndent(2, fmt.Sprintf("%d: %s", change.TxIdx, balance))
}
printWithIndent(1, "nonce changes:")
for _, change := range accountDiff.NonceChanges {
printWithIndent(2, fmt.Sprintf("%d: %d", change.TxIdx, change.Nonce))
}
if len(accountDiff.Code) > 0 {
printWithIndent(1, "code:")
printWithIndent(2, fmt.Sprintf("%d: %x", accountDiff.Code[0].TxIndex, accountDiff.Code[0].Code))
}
}
return res.String()
}
// Copy returns a deep copy of the access list
func (e *BlockAccessList) Copy() (res BlockAccessList) {
for _, accountAccess := range e.Accesses {
res.Accesses = append(res.Accesses, accountAccess.Copy())
}
return
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
// Code generated by rlpgen. DO NOT EDIT.
package bal
import "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
import "io"
func (obj *BlockAccessList) EncodeRLP(_w io.Writer) error {
w := rlp.NewEncoderBuffer(_w)
_tmp0 := w.List()
_tmp1 := w.List()
for _, _tmp2 := range obj.Accesses {
_tmp3 := w.List()
w.WriteBytes(_tmp2.Address[:])
_tmp4 := w.List()
for _, _tmp5 := range _tmp2.StorageWrites {
_tmp6 := w.List()
w.WriteBytes(_tmp5.Slot[:])
_tmp7 := w.List()
for _, _tmp8 := range _tmp5.Accesses {
_tmp9 := w.List()
w.WriteUint64(uint64(_tmp8.TxIdx))
w.WriteBytes(_tmp8.ValueAfter[:])
w.ListEnd(_tmp9)
}
w.ListEnd(_tmp7)
w.ListEnd(_tmp6)
}
w.ListEnd(_tmp4)
_tmp10 := w.List()
for _, _tmp11 := range _tmp2.StorageReads {
w.WriteBytes(_tmp11[:])
}
w.ListEnd(_tmp10)
_tmp12 := w.List()
for _, _tmp13 := range _tmp2.BalanceChanges {
_tmp14 := w.List()
w.WriteUint64(uint64(_tmp13.TxIdx))
w.WriteBytes(_tmp13.Balance[:])
w.ListEnd(_tmp14)
}
w.ListEnd(_tmp12)
_tmp15 := w.List()
for _, _tmp16 := range _tmp2.NonceChanges {
_tmp17 := w.List()
w.WriteUint64(uint64(_tmp16.TxIdx))
w.WriteUint64(_tmp16.Nonce)
w.ListEnd(_tmp17)
}
w.ListEnd(_tmp15)
_tmp18 := w.List()
for _, _tmp19 := range _tmp2.Code {
_tmp20 := w.List()
w.WriteUint64(uint64(_tmp19.TxIndex))
w.WriteBytes(_tmp19.Code)
w.ListEnd(_tmp20)
}
w.ListEnd(_tmp18)
w.ListEnd(_tmp3)
}
w.ListEnd(_tmp1)
w.ListEnd(_tmp0)
return w.Flush()
}
func (obj *BlockAccessList) DecodeRLP(dec *rlp.Stream) error {
var _tmp0 BlockAccessList
{
if _, err := dec.List(); err != nil {
return err
}
// Accesses:
var _tmp1 []AccountAccess
if _, err := dec.List(); err != nil {
return err
}
for dec.MoreDataInList() {
var _tmp2 AccountAccess
{
if _, err := dec.List(); err != nil {
return err
}
// Address:
var _tmp3 [20]byte
if err := dec.ReadBytes(_tmp3[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
_tmp2.Address = _tmp3
// StorageWrites:
var _tmp4 []encodingSlotWrites
if _, err := dec.List(); err != nil {
return err
}
for dec.MoreDataInList() {
var _tmp5 encodingSlotWrites
{
if _, err := dec.List(); err != nil {
return err
}
// Slot:
var _tmp6 [32]byte
if err := dec.ReadBytes(_tmp6[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
_tmp5.Slot = _tmp6
// Accesses:
var _tmp7 []encodingStorageWrite
if _, err := dec.List(); err != nil {
return err
}
for dec.MoreDataInList() {
var _tmp8 encodingStorageWrite
{
if _, err := dec.List(); err != nil {
return err
}
// TxIdx:
_tmp9, err := dec.Uint16()
if err != nil {
return err
}
_tmp8.TxIdx = _tmp9
// ValueAfter:
var _tmp10 [32]byte
if err := dec.ReadBytes(_tmp10[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
_tmp8.ValueAfter = _tmp10
if err := dec.ListEnd(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
_tmp7 = append(_tmp7, _tmp8)
}
if err := dec.ListEnd(); err != nil {
return err
}
_tmp5.Accesses = _tmp7
if err := dec.ListEnd(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
_tmp4 = append(_tmp4, _tmp5)
}
if err := dec.ListEnd(); err != nil {
return err
}
_tmp2.StorageWrites = _tmp4
// StorageReads:
var _tmp11 [][32]byte
if _, err := dec.List(); err != nil {
return err
}
for dec.MoreDataInList() {
var _tmp12 [32]byte
if err := dec.ReadBytes(_tmp12[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
_tmp11 = append(_tmp11, _tmp12)
}
if err := dec.ListEnd(); err != nil {
return err
}
_tmp2.StorageReads = _tmp11
// BalanceChanges:
var _tmp13 []encodingBalanceChange
if _, err := dec.List(); err != nil {
return err
}
for dec.MoreDataInList() {
var _tmp14 encodingBalanceChange
{
if _, err := dec.List(); err != nil {
return err
}
// TxIdx:
_tmp15, err := dec.Uint16()
if err != nil {
return err
}
_tmp14.TxIdx = _tmp15
// Balance:
var _tmp16 [16]byte
if err := dec.ReadBytes(_tmp16[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
_tmp14.Balance = _tmp16
if err := dec.ListEnd(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
_tmp13 = append(_tmp13, _tmp14)
}
if err := dec.ListEnd(); err != nil {
return err
}
_tmp2.BalanceChanges = _tmp13
// NonceChanges:
var _tmp17 []encodingAccountNonce
if _, err := dec.List(); err != nil {
return err
}
for dec.MoreDataInList() {
var _tmp18 encodingAccountNonce
{
if _, err := dec.List(); err != nil {
return err
}
// TxIdx:
_tmp19, err := dec.Uint16()
if err != nil {
return err
}
_tmp18.TxIdx = _tmp19
// Nonce:
_tmp20, err := dec.Uint64()
if err != nil {
return err
}
_tmp18.Nonce = _tmp20
if err := dec.ListEnd(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
_tmp17 = append(_tmp17, _tmp18)
}
if err := dec.ListEnd(); err != nil {
return err
}
_tmp2.NonceChanges = _tmp17
// Code:
var _tmp21 []CodeChange
if _, err := dec.List(); err != nil {
return err
}
for dec.MoreDataInList() {
var _tmp22 CodeChange
{
if _, err := dec.List(); err != nil {
return err
}
// TxIndex:
_tmp23, err := dec.Uint16()
if err != nil {
return err
}
_tmp22.TxIndex = _tmp23
// Code:
_tmp24, err := dec.Bytes()
if err != nil {
return err
}
_tmp22.Code = _tmp24
if err := dec.ListEnd(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
_tmp21 = append(_tmp21, _tmp22)
}
if err := dec.ListEnd(); err != nil {
return err
}
_tmp2.Code = _tmp21
if err := dec.ListEnd(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
_tmp1 = append(_tmp1, _tmp2)
}
if err := dec.ListEnd(); err != nil {
return err
}
_tmp0.Accesses = _tmp1
if err := dec.ListEnd(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
*obj = _tmp0
return nil
}

252
core/types/bal/bal_test.go Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
// Copyright 2025 The go-ethereum Authors
// This file is part of the go-ethereum library.
//
// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
package bal
import (
"bytes"
"cmp"
"reflect"
"slices"
"testing"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/internal/testrand"
"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
"github.com/holiman/uint256"
)
func equalBALs(a *BlockAccessList, b *BlockAccessList) bool {
if !reflect.DeepEqual(a, b) {
return false
}
return true
}
func makeTestConstructionBAL() *ConstructionBlockAccessList {
return &ConstructionBlockAccessList{
map[common.Address]*ConstructionAccountAccess{
common.BytesToAddress([]byte{0xff, 0xff}): {
StorageWrites: map[common.Hash]map[uint16]common.Hash{
common.BytesToHash([]byte{0x01}): {
1: common.BytesToHash([]byte{1, 2, 3, 4}),
2: common.BytesToHash([]byte{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}),
},
common.BytesToHash([]byte{0x10}): {
20: common.BytesToHash([]byte{1, 2, 3, 4}),
},
},
StorageReads: map[common.Hash]struct{}{
common.BytesToHash([]byte{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}): {},
},
BalanceChanges: map[uint16]*uint256.Int{
1: uint256.NewInt(100),
2: uint256.NewInt(500),
},
NonceChanges: map[uint16]uint64{
1: 2,
2: 6,
},
CodeChange: &CodeChange{
TxIndex: 0,
Code: common.Hex2Bytes("deadbeef"),
},
},
common.BytesToAddress([]byte{0xff, 0xff, 0xff}): {
StorageWrites: map[common.Hash]map[uint16]common.Hash{
common.BytesToHash([]byte{0x01}): {
2: common.BytesToHash([]byte{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}),
3: common.BytesToHash([]byte{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}),
},
common.BytesToHash([]byte{0x10}): {
21: common.BytesToHash([]byte{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}),
},
},
StorageReads: map[common.Hash]struct{}{
common.BytesToHash([]byte{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}): {},
},
BalanceChanges: map[uint16]*uint256.Int{
2: uint256.NewInt(100),
3: uint256.NewInt(500),
},
NonceChanges: map[uint16]uint64{
1: 2,
},
},
},
}
}
// TestBALEncoding tests that a populated access list can be encoded/decoded correctly.
func TestBALEncoding(t *testing.T) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
bal := makeTestConstructionBAL()
err := bal.EncodeRLP(&buf)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("encoding failed: %v\n", err)
}
var dec BlockAccessList
if err := dec.DecodeRLP(rlp.NewStream(bytes.NewReader(buf.Bytes()), 10000000)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decoding failed: %v\n", err)
}
if dec.Hash() != bal.toEncodingObj().Hash() {
t.Fatalf("encoded block hash doesn't match decoded")
}
if !equalBALs(bal.toEncodingObj(), &dec) {
t.Fatal("decoded BAL doesn't match")
}
}
func makeTestAccountAccess(sort bool) AccountAccess {
var (
storageWrites []encodingSlotWrites
storageReads [][32]byte
balances []encodingBalanceChange
nonces []encodingAccountNonce
)
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
slot := encodingSlotWrites{
Slot: testrand.Hash(),
}
for j := 0; j < 3; j++ {
slot.Accesses = append(slot.Accesses, encodingStorageWrite{
TxIdx: uint16(2 * j),
ValueAfter: testrand.Hash(),
})
}
if sort {
slices.SortFunc(slot.Accesses, func(a, b encodingStorageWrite) int {
return cmp.Compare[uint16](a.TxIdx, b.TxIdx)
})
}
storageWrites = append(storageWrites, slot)
}
if sort {
slices.SortFunc(storageWrites, func(a, b encodingSlotWrites) int {
return bytes.Compare(a.Slot[:], b.Slot[:])
})
}
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
storageReads = append(storageReads, testrand.Hash())
}
if sort {
slices.SortFunc(storageReads, func(a, b [32]byte) int {
return bytes.Compare(a[:], b[:])
})
}
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
balances = append(balances, encodingBalanceChange{
TxIdx: uint16(2 * i),
Balance: [16]byte(testrand.Bytes(16)),
})
}
if sort {
slices.SortFunc(balances, func(a, b encodingBalanceChange) int {
return cmp.Compare[uint16](a.TxIdx, b.TxIdx)
})
}
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
nonces = append(nonces, encodingAccountNonce{
TxIdx: uint16(2 * i),
Nonce: uint64(i + 100),
})
}
if sort {
slices.SortFunc(nonces, func(a, b encodingAccountNonce) int {
return cmp.Compare[uint16](a.TxIdx, b.TxIdx)
})
}
return AccountAccess{
Address: [20]byte(testrand.Bytes(20)),
StorageWrites: storageWrites,
StorageReads: storageReads,
BalanceChanges: balances,
NonceChanges: nonces,
Code: []CodeChange{
{
TxIndex: 100,
Code: testrand.Bytes(256),
},
},
}
}
func makeTestBAL(sort bool) BlockAccessList {
list := BlockAccessList{}
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
list.Accesses = append(list.Accesses, makeTestAccountAccess(sort))
}
if sort {
slices.SortFunc(list.Accesses, func(a, b AccountAccess) int {
return bytes.Compare(a.Address[:], b.Address[:])
})
}
return list
}
func TestBlockAccessListCopy(t *testing.T) {
list := makeTestBAL(true)
cpy := list.Copy()
cpyCpy := cpy.Copy()
if !reflect.DeepEqual(list, cpy) {
t.Fatal("block access mismatch")
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(cpy, cpyCpy) {
t.Fatal("block access mismatch")
}
// Make sure the mutations on copy won't affect the origin
for _, aa := range cpyCpy.Accesses {
for i := 0; i < len(aa.StorageReads); i++ {
aa.StorageReads[i] = [32]byte(testrand.Bytes(32))
}
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(list, cpy) {
t.Fatal("block access mismatch")
}
}
func TestBlockAccessListValidation(t *testing.T) {
// Validate the block access list after RLP decoding
enc := makeTestBAL(true)
if err := enc.Validate(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Unexpected validation error: %v", err)
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
if err := enc.EncodeRLP(&buf); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Unexpected encoding error: %v", err)
}
var dec BlockAccessList
if err := dec.DecodeRLP(rlp.NewStream(bytes.NewReader(buf.Bytes()), 0)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Unexpected RLP-decode error: %v", err)
}
if err := dec.Validate(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Unexpected validation error: %v", err)
}
// Validate the derived block access list
cBAL := makeTestConstructionBAL()
listB := cBAL.toEncodingObj()
if err := listB.Validate(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Unexpected validation error: %v", err)
}
}

View file

@ -535,9 +535,15 @@ func (d *Downloader) syncToHead() (err error) {
// If a part of blockchain data has already been written into active store, // If a part of blockchain data has already been written into active store,
// disable the ancient style insertion explicitly. // disable the ancient style insertion explicitly.
if origin >= frozen && frozen != 0 { if origin >= frozen && origin != 0 {
d.ancientLimit = 0 d.ancientLimit = 0
log.Info("Disabling direct-ancient mode", "origin", origin, "ancient", frozen-1) var ancient string
if frozen == 0 {
ancient = "null"
} else {
ancient = fmt.Sprintf("%d", frozen-1)
}
log.Info("Disabling direct-ancient mode", "origin", origin, "ancient", ancient)
} else if d.ancientLimit > 0 { } else if d.ancientLimit > 0 {
log.Debug("Enabling direct-ancient mode", "ancient", d.ancientLimit) log.Debug("Enabling direct-ancient mode", "ancient", d.ancientLimit)
} }

3
go.mod
View file

@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ require (
github.com/ethereum/c-kzg-4844/v2 v2.1.0 github.com/ethereum/c-kzg-4844/v2 v2.1.0
github.com/ethereum/go-verkle v0.2.2 github.com/ethereum/go-verkle v0.2.2
github.com/fatih/color v1.16.0 github.com/fatih/color v1.16.0
github.com/ferranbt/fastssz v0.1.2 github.com/ferranbt/fastssz v0.1.4
github.com/fjl/gencodec v0.1.0 github.com/fjl/gencodec v0.1.0
github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.6.0 github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.6.0
github.com/gballet/go-libpcsclite v0.0.0-20190607065134-2772fd86a8ff github.com/gballet/go-libpcsclite v0.0.0-20190607065134-2772fd86a8ff
@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ require (
github.com/cpuguy83/go-md2man/v2 v2.0.5 // indirect github.com/cpuguy83/go-md2man/v2 v2.0.5 // indirect
github.com/deepmap/oapi-codegen v1.6.0 // indirect github.com/deepmap/oapi-codegen v1.6.0 // indirect
github.com/dlclark/regexp2 v1.7.0 // indirect github.com/dlclark/regexp2 v1.7.0 // indirect
github.com/emicklei/dot v1.6.2 // indirect
github.com/garslo/gogen v0.0.0-20170306192744-1d203ffc1f61 // indirect github.com/garslo/gogen v0.0.0-20170306192744-1d203ffc1f61 // indirect
github.com/getsentry/sentry-go v0.27.0 // indirect github.com/getsentry/sentry-go v0.27.0 // indirect
github.com/go-ole/go-ole v1.3.0 // indirect github.com/go-ole/go-ole v1.3.0 // indirect

10
go.sum
View file

@ -108,14 +108,16 @@ github.com/dop251/goja v0.0.0-20230605162241-28ee0ee714f3 h1:+3HCtB74++ClLy8GgjU
github.com/dop251/goja v0.0.0-20230605162241-28ee0ee714f3/go.mod h1:QMWlm50DNe14hD7t24KEqZuUdC9sOTy8W6XbCU1mlw4= github.com/dop251/goja v0.0.0-20230605162241-28ee0ee714f3/go.mod h1:QMWlm50DNe14hD7t24KEqZuUdC9sOTy8W6XbCU1mlw4=
github.com/dop251/goja_nodejs v0.0.0-20210225215109-d91c329300e7/go.mod h1:hn7BA7c8pLvoGndExHudxTDKZ84Pyvv+90pbBjbTz0Y= github.com/dop251/goja_nodejs v0.0.0-20210225215109-d91c329300e7/go.mod h1:hn7BA7c8pLvoGndExHudxTDKZ84Pyvv+90pbBjbTz0Y=
github.com/dop251/goja_nodejs v0.0.0-20211022123610-8dd9abb0616d/go.mod h1:DngW8aVqWbuLRMHItjPUyqdj+HWPvnQe8V8y1nDpIbM= github.com/dop251/goja_nodejs v0.0.0-20211022123610-8dd9abb0616d/go.mod h1:DngW8aVqWbuLRMHItjPUyqdj+HWPvnQe8V8y1nDpIbM=
github.com/emicklei/dot v1.6.2 h1:08GN+DD79cy/tzN6uLCT84+2Wk9u+wvqP+Hkx/dIR8A=
github.com/emicklei/dot v1.6.2/go.mod h1:DeV7GvQtIw4h2u73RKBkkFdvVAz0D9fzeJrgPW6gy/s=
github.com/ethereum/c-kzg-4844/v2 v2.1.0 h1:gQropX9YFBhl3g4HYhwE70zq3IHFRgbbNPw0Shwzf5w= github.com/ethereum/c-kzg-4844/v2 v2.1.0 h1:gQropX9YFBhl3g4HYhwE70zq3IHFRgbbNPw0Shwzf5w=
github.com/ethereum/c-kzg-4844/v2 v2.1.0/go.mod h1:TC48kOKjJKPbN7C++qIgt0TJzZ70QznYR7Ob+WXl57E= github.com/ethereum/c-kzg-4844/v2 v2.1.0/go.mod h1:TC48kOKjJKPbN7C++qIgt0TJzZ70QznYR7Ob+WXl57E=
github.com/ethereum/go-verkle v0.2.2 h1:I2W0WjnrFUIzzVPwm8ykY+7pL2d4VhlsePn4j7cnFk8= github.com/ethereum/go-verkle v0.2.2 h1:I2W0WjnrFUIzzVPwm8ykY+7pL2d4VhlsePn4j7cnFk8=
github.com/ethereum/go-verkle v0.2.2/go.mod h1:M3b90YRnzqKyyzBEWJGqj8Qff4IDeXnzFw0P9bFw3uk= github.com/ethereum/go-verkle v0.2.2/go.mod h1:M3b90YRnzqKyyzBEWJGqj8Qff4IDeXnzFw0P9bFw3uk=
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@ -316,8 +318,8 @@ github.com/protolambda/zrnt v0.34.1 h1:qW55rnhZJDnOb3TwFiFRJZi3yTXFrJdGOFQM7vCwY
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