This implements a generic approach to enabling soft forks by allowing
anyone to put in hashes of contracts that should not be interacted from.
This will help "The DAO" in their endevour to stop any whithdrawals from
any DAO contract by convincing the mining community to accept their code
hash.
(cherry picked from commit 7a5b571c67)
This implements a generic approach to enabling soft forks by allowing
anyone to put in hashes of contracts that should not be interacted from.
This will help "The DAO" in their endevour to stop any whithdrawals from
any DAO contract by convincing the mining community to accept their code
hash.
We used to have reporting of bad blocks, but it was disabled
before the Frontier release. We need it back because users
are usually unable to provide the full RLP data of a bad
block when it occurs.
A shortcoming of this particular implementation is that the
origin peer is not tracked for blocks received during eth/63
sync. No origin peer info is still better than no report at
all though.
(cherry picked from commit ca18202eb9)
We used to have reporting of bad blocks, but it was disabled
before the Frontier release. We need it back because users
are usually unable to provide the full RLP data of a bad
block when it occurs.
A shortcoming of this particular implementation is that the
origin peer is not tracked for blocks received during eth/63
sync. No origin peer info is still better than no report at
all though.
Merge continue 2
Fake commit to restart the build servers
Fake commit to hopefully fix the PPA issue.
update versionOracle address for expanse
Merge continue 3
Merge continue 4
cleaned up a few Eth stragglers
Merge continue 5
Not sure why the merge tool changed this file and removed that but it
did.
merge continue 6
fixing expanse.js
Again not sure why this one got edited from the last one but -shrug-
fixing rpc calls for eth_ for compatibility
rpc calls still acting crazy
more rpc fixes
make jsre console accept both exp and eth cmds
rpc fixes continued
adding eth api calls
rpc and js-console both have eth calls on by default now
Added chain configuration options and write out during genesis database
insertion. If no "config" was found, nothing is written to the database.
Configurations are written on a per genesis base. This means
that any chain (which is identified by it's genesis hash) can have their
own chain settings.
The EVM was previously initialised and created for every CALL, CALLCODE,
DELEGATECALL and CREATE. This PR changes this behaviour so that the same
EVM can be used through the session and beyond as long as the
Environment sticks around.
Assuming the following scenario where a miner has 15% of all hashing
power and the ability to exert a moderate control over the network to
the point where if the attacker sees a message A, it can't stop A from
propagating, but what it **can** do is send a message B and ensure that
most nodes see B before A. The attacker can then selfish mine and
augment selfish mining strategy by giving his own blocks an advantage.
This change makes the time at which a block is received less relevant
and so the level of control an attacker has over the network no longer
makes a difference.
This change changes the current td algorithm `B_td > C_td` to the new
algorithm `B_td > C_td || B_td == C_td && rnd < 0.5`.
* Removed some strange code that didn't apply state reverting properly
* Refactored code setting from vm & state transition to the executioner
* Updated tests
Conflicts:
common/registrar/ethreg/api.go
core/tx_pool.go
core/vm/jit_test.go
* change gas cost for contract creating txs
* invalidate signature with s value greater than secp256k1 N / 2
* OOG contract creation if not enough gas to store code
* new difficulty adjustment algorithm
* new DELEGATECALL op code
Conflicts:
core/vm/environment.go
crypto/crypto.go
crypto/secp256k1/secp256.go
eth/api.go
Assuming the following scenario where a miner has 15% of all hashing
power and the ability to exert a moderate control over the network to
the point where if the attacker sees a message A, it can't stop A from
propagating, but what it **can** do is send a message B and ensure that
most nodes see B before A. The attacker can then selfish mine and
augment selfish mining strategy by giving his own blocks an advantage.
This change makes the time at which a block is received less relevant
and so the level of control an attacker has over the network no longer
makes a difference.
This change changes the current td algorithm `B_td > C_td` to the new
algorithm `B_td > C_td || B_td == C_td && rnd < 0.5`.
* Removed some strange code that didn't apply state reverting properly
* Refactored code setting from vm & state transition to the executioner
* Updated tests
* change gas cost for contract creating txs
* invalidate signature with s value greater than secp256k1 N / 2
* OOG contract creation if not enough gas to store code
* new difficulty adjustment algorithm
* new DELEGATECALL op code
The amount of gas available for tx execution was tracked in the
StateObject representing the coinbase account. This commit makes the gas
counter a separate type in package core, which avoids unintended
consequences of intertwining the counter with state logic.
* Moved `vm.Transfer` to `core` package and changed execution to call
`env.Transfer` instead of `core.Transfer` directly.
* core/vm: byte code VM moved to jump table instead of switch
* Moved `vm.Transfer` to `core` package and changed execution to call
`env.Transfer` instead of `core.Transfer` directly.
* Byte code VM now shares the same code as the JITVM
* Renamed Context to Contract
* Changed initialiser of state transition & unexported methods
* Removed the Execution object and refactor `Call`, `CallCode` &
`Create` in to their own functions instead of being methods.
* Removed the hard dep on the state for the VM. The VM now
depends on a Database interface returned by the environment. In the
process the core now depends less on the statedb by usage of the env
* Moved `Log` from package `core/state` to package `core/vm`.
update docker
update docker file
docker update 2
oi
docker again
update testnet block
update docker
update docker file
docker update 2
oi
docker again
update testnet block
update docker
update docker file
docker update 2
oi
docker again
docker2
docker3
fixed gvm
docker change
docking is meh
i hate docker
dockingsucks
update blockreward to 8
because its a lucky number 💃
update 60606 to 42786
60606 looks evil
42786 is my birthday
update jsre
replace eth for exp
update blocktime and test_genesis
fix test genesis
Reduced big int allocation by making stack items modifiable. Instead of
adding items such as `common.Big0` to the stack, `new(big.Int)` is
added instead. One must expect that any item that is added to the stack
might change.
* Update => SyncIntermediate
* Added SyncObjects
SyncIntermediate only updates whatever has changed, but, as a side
effect, requires much more disk space.
SyncObjects will only sync whatever is required for a block and will not
save intermediate state to disk. As drawback this requires more time
when more txs come in.
