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2e739fce58
This pull request introduces two constraints in the blobPool: (a) If the sender has a pending authorization or delegation, only one in-flight executable transaction can be cached. (b) If the authority address in a SetCode transaction is already reserved by the blobPool, the transaction will be rejected. These constraints mitigate an attack where an attacker spams the pool with numerous blob transactions, evicts other transactions, and then cancels all pending blob transactions by draining the sender’s funds if they have a delegation. Note, because there is no exclusive lock held between different subpools when processing transactions, it's totally possible the SetCode transaction and blob transactions with conflict sender and authorities are accepted simultaneously. I think it's acceptable as it's very hard to be exploited. --------- Co-authored-by: lightclient <lightclient@protonmail.com> |
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| .. | ||
| catalyst | ||
| downloader | ||
| ethconfig | ||
| fetcher | ||
| filters | ||
| gasestimator | ||
| gasprice | ||
| protocols | ||
| tracers | ||
| api_admin.go | ||
| api_backend.go | ||
| api_debug.go | ||
| api_debug_test.go | ||
| api_miner.go | ||
| backend.go | ||
| handler.go | ||
| handler_eth.go | ||
| handler_eth_test.go | ||
| handler_snap.go | ||
| handler_test.go | ||
| peer.go | ||
| peerset.go | ||
| state_accessor.go | ||
| sync.go | ||
| sync_test.go | ||