mirror of
https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum.git
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339 lines
9.9 KiB
Go
339 lines
9.9 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2014 The go-ethereum Authors
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// This file is part of the go-ethereum library.
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//
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// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
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// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
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// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
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// (at your option) any later version.
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//
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// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
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//
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// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
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// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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// Contains the Whisper protocol Message element. For formal details please see
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// the specs at https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Whisper-PoC-1-Protocol-Spec#messages.
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// todo: fix the spec link, and move it to doc.go
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package whisper05
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import (
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crand "crypto/rand"
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"errors"
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"crypto/aes"
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"crypto/cipher"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common"
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"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
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"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/logger"
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"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/logger/glog"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/pbkdf2"
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)
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// Options specifies the exact way a message should be wrapped into an Envelope.
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type Options struct {
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TTL uint32
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Src *ecdsa.PrivateKey
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Dst *ecdsa.PublicKey
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KeySym []byte
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Topic TopicType
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Pading []byte
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WorkTime uint32
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PoW float64
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}
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// SentMessage represents an end-user data packet to transmit through the
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// Whisper protocol. These are wrapped into Envelopes that need not be
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// understood by intermediate nodes, just forwarded.
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type SentMessage struct {
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Raw []byte
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}
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// ReceivedMessage represents a data packet to be received through the
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// Whisper protocol.
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type ReceivedMessage struct {
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Raw []byte
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Payload []byte
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Padding []byte
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Signature []byte
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PoW float64 // Proof of work as described in the Whisper spec
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Sent uint32 // Time when the message was posted into the network
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TTL uint32 // Maximum time to live allowed for the message
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Src *ecdsa.PublicKey // Message recipient (identity used to decode the message)
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Dst *ecdsa.PublicKey // Message recipient (identity used to decode the message)
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Topic TopicType
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TopicKeyHash common.Hash // The Keccak256Hash of the key, associated with the Topic
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EnvelopeHash common.Hash // Message envelope hash to act as a unique id
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}
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func DeriveTopicFromSymmetricKey(key []byte) TopicType {
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// todo: it is not secure enough, use kdf instead
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hash := crypto.Keccak256Hash(key)
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return HashToTopic(hash)
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}
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func isMessageSigned(flags byte) bool {
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return (flags & signatureFlag) != 0
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}
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func isMessagePadded(flags byte) bool {
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return (flags & paddingFlag) != 0
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}
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func (self *ReceivedMessage) isSymmetricEncryption() bool {
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return self.TopicKeyHash != common.Hash{}
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}
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func (self *ReceivedMessage) isAsymmetricEncryption() bool {
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return self.Dst != nil
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}
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// NewMessage creates and initializes a non-signed, non-encrypted Whisper message.
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func NewSentMessage(payload []byte) *SentMessage {
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// Construct an initial flag set: no signature, no padding, other bits random
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buf := make([]byte, 1)
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crand.Read(buf)
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flags := buf[0]
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flags &= ^signatureFlag
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flags &= ^paddingFlag
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msg := SentMessage{}
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msg.Raw = make([]byte, 1, len(payload)+signatureLength+maxPadLength+1)
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msg.Raw[0] = flags
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msg.Raw = append(msg.Raw, payload...)
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return &msg
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}
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// appendPadding appends the pseudorandom padding bytes and sets the padding flag.
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// The last byte contains the size of padding (thus, its size must not exceed 256).
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func (self *SentMessage) appendPadding(options Options) {
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if isMessageSigned(self.Raw[0]) {
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// this should not happen, but no reason to panic
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glog.V(logger.Error).Infof("Trying to pad a message which was already signed")
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return
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} else if isMessagePadded(self.Raw[0]) {
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// this should not happen, but no reason to panic
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glog.V(logger.Error).Infof("Trying to pad a message which was already padded")
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return
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}
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total := len(self.Raw)
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if options.Src != nil {
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total += signatureLength
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}
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odd := total % maxPadLength
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if odd > 0 {
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padSize := maxPadLength - odd
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buf := make([]byte, padSize)
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crand.Read(buf)
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if options.Pading != nil {
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copy(buf, options.Pading)
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}
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buf[padSize-1] = byte(padSize)
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self.Raw = append(self.Raw, buf...)
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self.Raw[0] |= paddingFlag
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}
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}
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// sign calculates and sets the cryptographic signature for the message,
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// also setting the sign flag.
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func (self *SentMessage) sign(key *ecdsa.PrivateKey) (err error) {
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if isMessageSigned(self.Raw[0]) {
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// this should not happen, but no reason to panic
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glog.V(logger.Error).Infof("Trying to sign a message which was already signed")
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return
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}
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hash := crypto.Keccak256(self.Raw)
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signature, err := crypto.Sign(hash, key)
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if err != nil {
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self.Raw = append(self.Raw, signature...)
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self.Raw[0] |= signatureFlag
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}
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return
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}
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// encryptAsymmetric encrypts a message with a public key.
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func (self *SentMessage) encryptAsymmetric(key *ecdsa.PublicKey) error {
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encrypted, err := crypto.Encrypt(key, self.Raw)
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if err == nil {
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self.Raw = encrypted
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}
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return err
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}
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// encryptSymmetric encrypts a message with a topic key, using AES-GCM-256.
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// nonce size should be 12 bytes (see cipher.gcmStandardNonceSize).
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func (self *SentMessage) encryptSymmetric(key []byte) (salt []byte, nonce []byte, err error) {
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salt = make([]byte, saltLength)
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_, err = crand.Read(salt)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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derivedKey := pbkdf2.Key(key, salt, kdfIterations, aesKeyLength, sha256.New)
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block, err := aes.NewCipher(derivedKey)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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aesgcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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// never use more than 2^32 random nonces with a given key
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nonce = make([]byte, aesgcm.NonceSize())
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_, err = crand.Read(nonce)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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self.Raw = aesgcm.Seal(nil, nonce, self.Raw, nil)
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return
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}
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// Wrap bundles the message into an Envelope to transmit over the network.
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//
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// pow (Proof Of Work) controls how much time to spend on hashing the message,
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// inherently controlling its priority through the network (smaller hash, bigger
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// priority).
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//
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// The user can control the amount of identity, privacy and encryption through
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// the options parameter as follows:
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// - options.From == nil && options.To == nil: anonymous broadcast
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// - options.From != nil && options.To == nil: signed broadcast (known sender)
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// - options.From == nil && options.To != nil: encrypted anonymous message
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// - options.From != nil && options.To != nil: encrypted signed message
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func (self *SentMessage) Wrap(options Options) (envelope *Envelope, err error) {
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if options.TTL == 0 {
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options.TTL = DefaultTTL
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}
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self.appendPadding(options)
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if options.Src != nil {
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if err = self.sign(options.Src); err != nil {
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return
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}
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}
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if len(self.Raw) > msgMaxLength {
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glog.V(logger.Error).Infof("Message size must not exceed %d bytes", msgMaxLength)
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err = errors.New("Oversized message")
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return
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}
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var salt, nonce []byte
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if options.Dst != nil {
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err = self.encryptAsymmetric(options.Dst)
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} else if options.KeySym != nil {
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salt, nonce, err = self.encryptSymmetric(options.KeySym)
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} else {
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err = errors.New("Unable to encrypt the message: neither Dst nor Key")
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}
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if err == nil {
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if (options.Topic == TopicType{}) {
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options.Topic = DeriveTopicFromSymmetricKey(options.KeySym)
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}
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envelope = NewEnvelope(options.TTL, options.Topic, salt, nonce, self)
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envelope.Seal(options)
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}
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return
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}
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// decryptSymmetric decrypts a message with a topic key, using AES-GCM-256.
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// nonce size should be 12 bytes (see cipher.gcmStandardNonceSize).
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func (self *ReceivedMessage) decryptSymmetric(key []byte, salt []byte, nonce []byte) error {
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derivedKey := pbkdf2.Key(key, salt, kdfIterations, aesKeyLength, sha256.New)
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block, err := aes.NewCipher(derivedKey)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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aesgcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if len(nonce) != aesgcm.NonceSize() {
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glog.V(logger.Error).Infof("AES nonce size must be %d bytes", aesgcm.NonceSize())
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return errors.New("Wrong AES nonce size")
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}
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decrypted, err := aesgcm.Open(nil, nonce, self.Raw, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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self.Raw = decrypted
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return nil
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}
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// decryptAsymmetric decrypts an encrypted payload with a private key.
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func (self *ReceivedMessage) decryptAsymmetric(key *ecdsa.PrivateKey) error {
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decrypted, err := crypto.Decrypt(key, self.Raw)
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if err == nil {
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self.Raw = decrypted
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}
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return err
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}
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// Validate checks the validity and extracts the fields in case of success
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func (self *ReceivedMessage) Validate() bool {
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sz := len(self.Raw)
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cur := sz
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if sz < 1 {
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return false
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}
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if isMessageSigned(self.Raw[0]) {
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cur -= signatureLength
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if cur <= 1 {
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return false
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}
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self.Signature = self.Raw[cur:]
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self.Src = self.Recover()
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if self.Src == nil {
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return false
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}
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}
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if isMessagePadded(self.Raw[0]) {
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paddingSize := int(self.Raw[cur-1])
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beg := cur - paddingSize
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if beg <= 1 {
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return false
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}
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self.Padding = self.Raw[beg : cur-1]
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cur = beg
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}
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self.Payload = self.Raw[1:cur]
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if self.isSymmetricEncryption() == self.isAsymmetricEncryption() {
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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// Recover retrieves the public key of the message signer.
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func (self *ReceivedMessage) Recover() *ecdsa.PublicKey {
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defer func() { recover() }() // in case of invalid signature
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pub, err := crypto.SigToPub(self.hash(), self.Signature)
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if err != nil {
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glog.V(logger.Error).Infof("Could not get public key from signature: %v", err)
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return nil
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}
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return pub
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}
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// hash calculates the SHA3 checksum of the message flags, payload and padding.
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func (self *ReceivedMessage) hash() []byte {
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if isMessageSigned(self.Raw[0]) {
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sz := len(self.Raw) - signatureLength
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return crypto.Keccak256(self.Raw[:sz])
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}
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return crypto.Keccak256(self.Raw)
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}
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